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Introduction
This paper highlights a crisis in modern political life
in Western liberal democracies. Overwhelmingly the 
citizenries in contemporary democracies are disengaged 
from formal political life (O’Toole et al 2003; Snell 2010; 
Edwards 2009). There is a decline in engagement in 
political party membership and in voter participation. 
Political theorists have long touted the importance of non-
government organisations and civil society in bridging this 
gap and engaging citizens (Bratton 1994; Cohen & Arato 
1992; Charnovitz, 1997). However, as environmental non-
government organisations (ENGOs) have increased in 
professionalism and become bureaucratised, they now 
face similar citizen disappointment and disengagement. 
Will citizens now turn to grassroots and community based 
political action to ensure the authenticity and relevance 
of contemporary liberal democracies, as well as the 
democratic accountability of elected officials?
While this volume highlights the importance and role of 
community based action on climate change, this paper 
connects the rising use and influence of community 
action in this area to questions about the health of 
modern liberal democracy, the role and effectiveness of 
ENGOs, the voice of public opinion in contemporary public 
policy debate and the overall impact on citizen political 
engagement. The paper will argue, with reference to the 
politics of climate change in Australia, the United Kingdom 
(UK) and the United States of America (USA), that citizen 
political engagement has been significantly compromised 
by governments that fail to meet citizen demands for 
effective public policy action and the weak performance 
of ENGOs. Thus significant public disengagement from 
political life continues, leading us to question the health 
and legitimacy of contemporary liberal democracies. The 
flourishing of community based political action on climate 
change however reveals some signs of hope.
Climate Policy Failure
The backdrop of this argument is the profound failure to 
formulate or implement effective public policy on climate 
change nationally or internationally in the majority of 
contemporary liberal democracies, despite strong public 
support for doing so. The international politics of climate 
change and the significant shortcomings of current 
approaches to, and status of, international agreements 
are well documented (for example see: Falkner et al 2010; 
Gupta 2010). This paper focuses on climate policy failure 
in the national arenas of Australia, the USA and the UK.
The politics of climate change in the US is fraught. Public 
opinion on climate change in the US is polarised and 
largely divided along ideological lines (Nisbet 2009). 
However, the introduction of effective climate change 
policy was a key election promise of President Obama, 
who inspired a record election turnout in the United 
States (Osborn et al 2010). In 2008, over 54% of the 
US public saw climate change as a high or very high 
priority for the President and Congress, though in 2010, 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) eclipsed this, with a 
decline to 38% (Leiserowitz et al 2010). President Obama 
committed the USA to international climate action, but as 
noted above, current non–binding international action is 
inadequate and flawed, with most signatories indicating 
that their emissions have increased rather than declined 
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(Friedlingstein et al 2010). In terms of national action, 
significant policy failure is clear, despite some promising 
state and regional efforts. Meaningful federal climate 
legislation and regulatory action, particularly a cap on 
carbon emissions, remains elusive (Wasserman 2012).
Similarly to the USA, the election of the Rudd-led 
Labor party in 2007 led to Australia’s ratification of the 
Kyoto protocol, and Australia’s return to a meaningful 
engagement with the international politics of climate 
change (Rootes, 2008). During the election campaign, 
Kevin Rudd's campaign platform included effective action 
on climate action in the lead up to the election. Public 
support for the government’s position was strong – by 
2008 58% of Australians supported an ETS approach to 
climate change policy (Pietsch & McAllister 2010). Despite 
this, an ETS was not instituted by the Rudd government, 
and the subsequent Gillard government's proposed 
carbon tax has been fraught, complicated by lack of public 
support for the Prime Minister and the GFC. Thus, climate 
policy failure in Australia is also evident, with Australia on 
track to a significant emissions increase.
Initially the picture in the UK is brighter. The UK and the EU 
have been signatories to the Kyoto Protocol since 2002. 
The UK participates in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
which commenced in 2005. Public opinion and concern 
about climate change in the UK is high: 48% believe that 
climate is changing and 71% are very or fairly concerned 
about climate change (Reser et al 2010). The UK is also 
bound by the EU’s progressive approach to greenhouse 
gas emission reductions and the associated targets. 
However, again, these policies have proven ineffective at 
arresting climate change, with the UK experiencing a 3.1% 
increase in the six greenhouse gas emissions covered 
by the Kyoto Protocol from 2009 – 2010 (Department of 
Energy and Climate Change 2012). Additionally, analysis 
of previous reductions suggests that they were illusory 
(Rees 2011).
Thus, it is clear, that despite majority public support 
for effective climate change policy, current approaches 
to climate policy across major contemporary liberal 
democracies have been a failure. Such a situation 
prompts further investigation into why citizen support 
for policy change have not been communicated and 
converted to action, and the role of civil society in this 
failure.
Current ENGO Challenges
We can observe an environment movement globally at 
a significant crossroads. As a campaign issue climate 
change presents difficulties for ENGOs in and of itself. 
Climate change, its causes and effects, as an issue is 
without faces or clear targets – it is intangible in a world 
of citizens and governments that find it hard to grasp 
anything beyond the tangible (O’Neill & Hulme 2009; 
also see Rootes, this volume and Rootes & Doyle this 
volume). Yet, the nature, urgency and severity of climate 
change have placed the issue at the centre of the 
contemporary environment movement – it has become 
the meta-frame that shapes and informs the movement. 
This has important consequences for the movement and 
for environmental politics more generally.
The first of these impacts is the relationship between 
global, national and local issues, campaigns and the 
movement. In Australia, the US and the UK, the climate 
movement is dominated by several large ENGOs. These 
ENGOs, including Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth (in 
the UK more than Australia) and the Sierra Club, dominate 
the public profile and government engagement with the 
movement. The work of these groups is focused and 
limited by the human, information and financial resources 
available to them. Hence, on climate change, there has 
been a focus on international negotiations and national 
government policy. This is understandable given the 
limitations of these groups and the need to identify clear 
issues and targets against which to campaign. However, 
this has implications for the movement as a whole. The 
focus on the international and the national leaves ENGOs 
disconnected from local issues and local campaigns (see 
Woods and Hutton, this volume). It is local issues and 
campaigns that provide the opportunity to directly engage 
citizens facing the arrival of climate change and the 
chance to make climate change tangible for both citizens 
and governments. In addition, local issues and campaigns 
that seek support and help from ENGOs need to mobilise 
the frame of climate change to gain this support (see 
Doyle & Lockhart, this volume), even if the real nature 
of their issues are not connected to the climate change 
meta-frame. Without this wider frame, local action is often 
written off as NIMBY (‘not in my back yard’) action and 
thus, not worthy of attention by large ENGOs, the media 
and politicians. 
While partnering with and supporting local actions and 
campaigns allows ENGOs to draw upon the passion 
of community and place-based action provided by 
local campaigns, it can compromise the nature of 
local campaigns. The need to connect with the climate 
change meta-frame, the tendency towards campaigning 
homogeneity (see Woods, this volume) and coordination 
may compromise local and community based campaigns, 
leading to some of the same challenges currently facing 
the large ENGOs.
The Failure of Current ENGO Approaches
The current failure of climate policy across contemporary 
liberal democracies has implications for the efficacy 
of large campaigning ENGOs and civil society more 
broadly. An inability to convert majority public concern 
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support and a strong common voice, better public policy 
outcomes have not materialised. In the US and Australia, 
attempts at building stronger alliances to produce better 
outcomes have been even less successful. This strongly 
suggests that moving the focus of the movement towards 
homogenisation is not the answer (see Woods, this 
volume), and may in fact weaken the movement.
A Community Action Future?
The papers in this volume present case studies, as well as 
commentary, on community action and campaigning from 
Australia to Nigeria to Dublin to London. They highlight 
the richness and depth in action on climate change 
being undertaken outside the relationship between the 
relevant governments and large professionalised ENGOs. 
The obvious question to ponder is therefore, are local, 
community actions more successful than current ENGOs’ 
campaigning on climate change. There are three ways it 
can be argued they are.
The situating of community action on climate change in 
local communities and local issues provides clear faces 
and clear targets to fight on climate change, whether this 
is Shell in Nigeria or coal ships in Newcastle. Community 
action is able to take the meta-frame of climate change, 
which is difficult to communicate and conceptualise and 
make it tangible. Given discourse about how challenging 
this is to achieve (Ockwell et al 2009) and the ability of 
community and local action to achieve this, it is no small 
accomplishment in the fight to bridge the gap between 
public concern and public action on climate change.
The second way in which community action on climate 
change can be argued to be more successful is in relation 
to engagement of the public. The current role of the general 
public in climate action by professionalised ENGOs is one 
of sporadic engagement at best as a member or donor, 
as a letter writer or petitioner, or as an occasional protest 
marcher. In this period of disengagement of the public in 
modern democracies from political life, this approach does 
nothing to re-engage the public, or to restore their sense 
of involvement in an authentic democracy. Community 
and local action approaches alternatively offer and 
encourage opportunities for involvement, engagement 
and a role in important local issues for citizens. This opens 
the door to the opportunity for re-engaging citizens in 
political life by helping citizens observe and experience a 
positive relationship between their aspirations and public 
policy. Thus grassroots and community campaigns can 
reinvigorate faith in active democracy.
Thirdly, community action on climate change accepts 
the need for many voices on climate issues, rather 
than speaking with just one voice. Given the lack of 
success of otherwise promising alliances between 
and support on climate change issues suggests a failure 
of the efficacy of current campaign outcomes, though not 
necessarily a failure of the campaigns themselves. While 
political theory and democratic principles posit a clear 
relationship between public sentiment and political action 
expressed as public policy, this relationship is complicated 
by powerful vested interests and other public policy goals.
Australia and the United States have both faced 
governments that have been significantly recalcitrant on 
climate change action, both nationally and internationally 
(Von Stein 2008). While the previous UK government 
had performed well nationally, at the EU parliament, 
and internationally, the current government shows less 
enthusiasm. While the change of government in Australia 
and the US provided hope of both governments breaking 
the dominance of other lobby influences, especially those 
of fossil fuel interests that have substantial influence in 
both countries (Bang 2010; Pearse 2009), this is not yet 
evident. This is significant given the focus of ENGOs’ 
activism.
In Australia, the US and the UK, to differing extents, the 
key focus of ENGO activism is national governments. In 
the Australian context this is tempered by the existence of 
state governments also as a target of activism. However, 
the key focus of ENGO activities is around government 
policy and lobbying, especially amongst the highly 
organised and professionalised ENGOs. In the US, this 
is even more the case with the key ENGOs located near, 
and focused on lobbying on Capitol Hill, the locus of US 
Government activity. ENGO activity at the state level is 
largely undertaken by regionally based groups. A similar 
pattern is evident in the UK with the majority of ENGOs 
located in London, undertaking lobbying work there, with 
the addition of a focus on activity at the EU level. The 
inherent challenge of this campaigning focus is in the 
clear competition between the voice of ENGOs and other, 
often deeply entrenched, interests on the issue of climate 
change. Governments relegate ENGOs to the status of 
simply one other self-interested group of many amongst 
which governments must determine the national interest.
In an attempt to leverage greater influence on government 
calculations concerning national interest, and gain a 
stronger voice in public policy debates on climate change, 
ENGOs have sought to improve their alliance politics in 
the UK. This has been demonstrated by the emergence 
of an umbrella campaigning organisation collaboration, 
Stop Climate Chaos (SCC), between key environmental, 
aid and development groups (Saunders 2008). The 
organisation works to put aside group differences, past 
disagreements and to forge a common voice and message 
in the climate change debate leading to larger public 
support and public protests for better policy outcomes 
(see Rootes, this volume). However, despite strong public 
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ENGOs, such as the Stop Climate Chaos experiment 
in the UK, heterogeneity in the movement is a good 
premise. While retaining an over-arching concern with 
improving outcomes on climate change, heterogeneity 
enables actors from different movements and elements 
to campaign in ways best for them, to form clear targets 
most appropriate for their members, to communicate 
as is best for their constituency, and to work within their 
community, human and resource limitations.
Having said this, the success of community action and 
its advantages can only take the movement so far. If the 
key objective of the movement is to ensure mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change, the summation of individual 
community actions locally, nationally and internationally is 
unlikely to be successful on its own. Without coordination 
and cooperation between groups on actions and without 
ensuring the formation and capacity building of groups 
in all localities, community action alone cannot ensure 
effective action on climate change or efficacy in public 
policy on climate change. 
So where does this leave climate activism in contemporary 
liberal democracies? Current approaches to influencing 
public policy on climate change have been thus far 
unsuccessful while the promise offered by community 
based approaches to climate activism has limitations. 
If the end goal of both ENGOs and community based 
activism is to be achieved, it will be important to avoid 
a break between the two or a split into two movements, 
such as happened in the US between the mainstream 
environment movement and the environmental justice 
movement (Cole & Foster 2001).
In contemporary liberal democracies the disjuncture 
between public opinion and current public policies on 
climate change indicates a significant obstacle to ENGOs. 
Community action groups can assist ENGOs circumvent 
this obstacle through their ability to provide tangible, local 
stories on climate change that engage both the public 
and governments. Therefore, community action can 
more strongly engage the public, but also provide clear 
local narratives on climate change for governments to 
demonstrate the importance of effective public policy in 
the national interest. Thus it also provides tangible victims 
and villains to motivate and focus action.
ENGOs on the other hand bring a wealth of experience 
engaging the government, as well as contacts and 
resources unavailable to most community action groups. 
However, for ENGOs to engage with community action 
groups, or in community action itself, it will require 
significant reflection and some changes on behalf of 
ENGOs (see Whelan, this volume).
Conclusion
This paper has argued that the failure of modern liberal 
democracies including Australia, the USA and the UK, 
to form and implement effective public policy on climate 
change has implications beyond this policy area. In the 
face of majority public support for effective action on 
climate change, both governments and ENGOs have 
failed the public, shaking an already fragile sense of trust 
against a backdrop of political disengagement. Publics 
fundamentally disengaged from formal politics, are now 
disengaging from non-government organisations and civil 
society. This disaffection is understandable in the face of 
ENGOs’ current lack of success in delivering meaningful 
policy outcomes on climate change. Many ENGOs have 
been too  content to engage governments on their terms 
and their turf and to accept small, incremental policy 
change in the face of the clear scientifically determined 
need for large, radical policy change on this issue. The 
broader message from public disaffection concerns 
the continued relevance of ENGOs and the health of 
democracy. As the focus of public action and engagement 
moves towards community and grassroots organising 
on climate change, space needs to open for reflection 
and review by ENGOs. In an international climate where 
public opinion backs effective policy action, and where 
there has long been public support for ENGOs, why has 
so little been achieved? Has the professionalisation and 
bureaucratisation of the large ENGOs in the movement 
left it out of touch with its public base? 
Such a strong public disengagement from formal civil 
politics and society leads us to question the health of 
contemporary liberal democracies. If citizens feel they 
have no voice in formal politics, and that civil society 
is also inadequate to represent their interests, then we 
are in an era of a very hollow democracy indeed. While 
grassroots and community action offers some hope for 
disengaged citizens, it also signals something very sick 
in our democracy, which may be terminal without a re-
building of the links of citizen voice and engagement 
between the voting public, their elected leaders and civil 
society.
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